Eradication of Corruption

    Eradication of Corruption

     Eradication of corruption should be the nation’s number-one priority in view of the ever-increasing horizon of political and administrative corruption and its baneful multifarious effects on the society-at-large. It needs to be understood by all that eradication of corruption is only possible if strong political commitment exists. Without strong political commitment, bureaucratic reorientation and a vibrant and effective civil society, checking corruption turns into a very difficult almost impossible task. In the context of Bangladesh only radical and fundamental policy measures initiated and strongly backed by a committed political leadership and supported and implemented by a reoriented bureaucracy and watched and monitored by an organized and vocal civil society can control corruption.

     Given the presence of three crucial variables - committed political leadership, reoriented bureaucracy and an organized and vocal civil society - other policy measures need to be adopted to effectively contain as well as control corruption. What is proposed below are a number of long-term and short-term policy measures placed in wider socio-political and economic contexts to control corruption.

     The public sector employs over a million people in 35 ministries, 50 divisions, 221 departments, 139 directorates and autonomous bodies and 153 state enterprises (World Bank 1996b:57). It may also be added that since independence the number of ministries, departments and public servants has doubled (Khan, 1997). In the context of present reality there is little rationale for maintaining a huge public-sector edifice which contributes to corruption in public dealings. There is now justification for right-sizing the government. Right-sizing of government will, among other things, will discourage creation and maintenance of redundant agencies and units and restrain doling out of public-service jobs as political favours.

     Public-sector accountability is weak, fuzzy and tenuous at best. This has resulted in the inability to enforce financial contracts, stop theft in public enterprises and hold officials accountable for improper or delayed judgment (World Bank, 1996a:viii). A number of actions need to taken simultaneously to institutionalize and strengthen accountability to effectively counter corruption. First, a bi-partisan parliamentary task force be established to bolster the standing committees, instituting the practice of questioning ministers and providing members of parliament with adequate office and research facilities and setting up of an office of Ombudsman (World Bank, 1996a:viii). A parliamentary secretariat should be established outside the sphere of civil service and manned by competent personnel recruited separately and controlled by the speaker of the parliament (Khan, 1997). Second, the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) must be reorganized and strengthened by enhancing the capacity of the CAG (World Bank, 1996a:ix). Third, the standards of performance of ministries/divisions and their attached agencies should be made known to the citizens (Rahman, et al., 1993:52). Fourth, complaint procedures should be in place in government agencies for wider use of citizens (Khan, 1997). Fifth, monitoring procedures need to be tightened so that the concerned civil servant knows the extent of compliance by his subordinates to relevant orders and directives as well as services provided to citizens. Sixth, units be established in each ministry and division to develop and apply performance criteria and measures and to develop internal performance audit (UNDP, 1993:106).

     Transparency in public-sector decision making is totally absent. This absence, in turn, contributes to corruption. Civil servants by and large value secrecy and are totally unwilling to share information about decisions with citizens. Openness and transparency are alien concepts in public bureaucracy in Bangladesh (Khan, 1997). A number of actions have been recommended to ensure transparency and thereby considerably empower citizens and consequently contain corruption (World Bank, 1996a:xii). First, the Official Secrets Act of 1923 and Government Service Conduct Rules of 1979 should be suitably modified. Second, a task-force on public-sector transparency should be estabilished with membership from different professional and occupational groups to suggest measures to enhance transparency. Third, necessary steps should be taken to make all contract evaluation reports public, thereby enabling all bidders to see how evaluations are made. Still other steps should be taken to ensure transparency and reduce corruption (Khan, 1997). Fourth, earning and tax payments of all public officials - elected as well as appointed - should be published each year to enable the people to learn about the assets of public officials. Fifth, interested citizens must be allowed access to relevant files and documents. For this to happen the number of files marked secret and top secret should be drastically reduced. Sixth, civil servants long accustomed to transact public business under the veil of secrecy should be appropriately trained and indoctrinated to bring about necessary changes in their attitudes and work habits.

     A number of specific policy measures have been recommended to control corruption in politics and administration (World Bank, 1996a:xii; Rahman, et al.,1993:97 and Khan, 1997). First, a high-powered task force to be established consisting of public officials, parliamentarians and leading citizens to review all relevant issues pertaining to corruption and to suggest a comprehensive eradication programme. Second, an autonomous standing committee to be formed with judges, senior public officials and leading citizens to oversee the activities of the Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC) as well as authorize investigation in ministries, corporations and other agencies by a statutory appointed and protected public prosecutor. Third, salary and benefits of civil servants need to be at par with their counterparts in the private sector. Fourth, provision of severe punishment including long stays in jails and confisation of assets and properties to be instituted for civil servants involved in corruption. Other measures have also been suggested to counter political and administrative corruption (Paul, 1997:288-304). Fifth, a code of conduct should be adopted by the parliament to provide guidelines for the conduct of elected representatives and to take appropriate steps when departures from accepted norms are detected. Sixth, elected representatives must be compensated suitably to enable them to devote their attention only to public welfare and service. Seventh, enactment of a law to regulate the functioning of political parties is needed. This law would require political parties to hold regular organizational elections at different levels; maintain prompt and systematic accounts and submit audited accounts to either the Election Commission or the Comptroller and Auditor General; and comply with income tax regulations and guidelines. Eighth, election expenditure needs to be reduced and closely monitored by a designated body. Ninth, deregulation and debureaucratisation, bounded discretion in decision making, realignment of the government’s audit and intelligence are to be encouraged to control corruption. Tenth, existence of free media so that they can investigate and expose corrupt practices. Eleventh, voluntary agencies and religious groups as well as other components of civil society can play significant role in constraining corruption in public delaine.