The Politics of India-us Nuclear Agreement

The India-US Nuclear agreement is the subject of hope and debate, yet again, in India. Apart from the substance of the pact, the politics (and timing) of the negotiations is mystifying.

First, the substance of the pact: the benefits -- immediate access to nuclear technology and nuclear fuel -- are very robust. India's need for energy is monumental and nuclear energy must form a part of the energy portfolio for India.

The United States -- President Bush -- has made an extra-ordinary offer to India. The President is championing exception (for India) to the 1978 congressional mandate that the non-signatories of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act cannot under any circumstances receive any nuclear technology or fuel from the United States. The so-called Nuclear Suppliers Group follow the United States lead on this matter.

So this is truly historic. India owes a debt of gratitude to President Bush and the United States. However, the Hyde Amendment is troublesome.

The Hyde Amendment which requires the President to advise the Congress every year that India was not diverting nuclear technology and material for weaponry. While it is very true that President George Bush has high respect for India’s integrity and trust. However, what the political landscape would be in 10 or 20 years is anyone guess – it is not clear that a nation’s future can be so tenuously linked to certification by an individual. Look at what happened to Pakistan. The then President Bush in 1990 failed to certify Pakistan’s intentions regarding its nuclear ambitions, and the Pressler amendment called for economic and military sanctions which reverberated till recently.

But President Bush cannot do much about Hyde Amendment -- this is the requirement that the U.S. Congress is imposing for the extra-ordinary exception that it is ready to make for India. This requirement is entirely reasonable from the perspective of Congress, however troublesome that it may be to India or subject to the vagaries of time and the whims and fancies of a future President who may be annoyed with India on some other matter and may decide not to certify based on that irritation. There is no basis on which President Bush can push the Congress to do away with the Hyde Amendment -- President Bush is already facing strong opposition from the Congress, particularly from the Democrats.

Having said this, if India is ready to accept the risk with the Hyde Amendment the Indian Government must have moved with greater dispatch. It was India's responsibility to sign India-specific accords with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before the U.S. Congress can approve the nuclear agreement.

But India has dithered on this matter for almost one year. That is because of the Communists parties who have about 60 parliamentary seats and who have been electoral partners with Congress party are strongly opposed the nuclear agreement -- their opposition is well thought-out, and it is mostly based on the Hyde Amendment.

The Congress party has spent one year trying to persuade the Communists parties -- and it has not been successful. Finally, the Congress party is threatening to go ahead with the negotiations with IAEA but why now? This is so late.

By the time, India concludes its negotiations with IAEA it will be atleast a couple of months. So the agreement cannot placed before the U.S. Congress before fall. But the agenda for fall for the Congress is set in place -- and the Congressional leaders have already said that it is too late for debate and approval of the nuclear agreement.

Unfortunately, President Bush can do only so much -- particularly with the U.S. Presidential and congressional elections looming ahead so close. Once the November elections take place (Democratic party is likely to gain substantial number of seats in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, and quite likely even the White House), President Bush's influence will diminish dramatically.

So what is point of Congress party being so decisive so late? It appears that the Congress party did not want to risk alienating the Communist parties but now since the national elections are only 6-9 months away the Congress party appears ready to roll the dice. Politically, that is not in the self-interest of the Congress party. Unless the Congress party can hold the Communist parties in its fold for the next general elections, its probability of winning those elections will diminish dramatically.

So what is the point? It just does not compute. The nuclear agreement is most unlikely to be approved by the U.S. Congress given the serious time constraints and the dynamics of U.S. political environment. The Congress party is also likely to lower its odds of winning the next elections.